Organizational Behavior: Production of Knowledge for Action in the World of Practice by Argyris, Chris
Cornell University ILR School
DigitalCommons@ILR
Articles and Chapters ILR Collection
1998
Organizational Behavior: Production of
Knowledge for Action in the World of Practice
Chris Argyris
Harvard University
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles
Part of the Labor Relations Commons, and the Organizational Behavior and Theory Commons
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR.
Support this valuable resource today!
This Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the ILR Collection at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles
and Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please contact hlmdigital@cornell.edu.
Organizational Behavior: Production of Knowledge for Action in the
World of Practice
Abstract
If a policy is a solution, “actionable knowledge is the actual behavior required to implement the solution”
Keywords
organizational behavior, practical applications, practitioners, actionable knowledge
Disciplines
Labor Relations | Organizational Behavior and Theory
Comments
Suggested Citation
Argyris, C. (1998). Organizational behavior: Production of knowledge for action in the world of practice
[Electronic version]. In J. McKelvey and M. Neufeld, (Eds.), Industrial relations at the dawn of the new
millennium (pp. 54-61). Ithaca, NY: New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations.
Required Publisher Statement
© Cornell University Press. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved.
This chapter is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/959
I f  a policy is a solution, “actionable knowledge is the 
actual behavior required to implement the solution”
Chris Argyris, whose th irty  books include On 
Organizational Learning, is the James Bryant C onant 
Professor o f Education and  O rganizational Behavior 
in the G raduate School o f Business A dm inistration 
at H arvard  U niversity
4 55
Chris Argyris
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR
Production of Knowledge for Action in the World of Practice
O C IA L  SC IEN T ISTS HAVE B E E N  IN T E R E S T E D  FOR MANY
years in producing knowledge that is relevant to everyday 
life. In my field it is called knowledge that has “external” va­
lidity, relevance beyond the context in which the knowledge 
was obtained (Campbell and Stanley, 1963). Yet a scholarly 
reviewer, in a scholarly journal, recently concluded that the 
breach between social scientists and citizens, created by the nonap­
plicability of the knowledge produced by the scientists, is growing 
larger. He notes that Representative George E. Brown, Jr., who is rec­
ognized as one of science’s great champions, has written a report that 
warns scholars about continuing their apparent sense of unconcern 
about the breach (Johnson, 1993).
I believe that Johnson and Brown are correct. Scholars, by and 
large, espouse relevance and actionability but then pay little attention 
to these features when they conduct their research. For example, al­
though most books and articles on research in organizational behav­
ior discuss relevance (usually in a final chapter), none, that I could 
discover, give actionability the same status as validity. The advice they 
give to researchers assumes that with decent validity, and with the ac­
cumulation of knowledge, actionability will follow. This assumption, 
in turn, contains a more questionable one, namely, that there will be a 
relatively seamless relationship between the causality that researchers 
used to produce their knowledge and the causality the practitioners
will use to implement that knowledge. The seamless quality is dictated 
by the fact that in order for practitioners to implement scientific 
propositions they will have to use the concept of causality that the re­
searchers used to produce the propositions.
In order to illustrate this claim, I begin with a few words on the 
meaning of actionable knowledge in the domain of practice to which 
I refer. The domain is understanding and solving complex problems 
in organizations (technical or human) that are embarrassing or 
threatening. I select this domain because that is where practitioners 
need help the most. They learn how to solve simple, nonembarrass­
ing, nonthreatening problems as a matter of course.
Actionable knowledge is that knowledge that practitioners use in 
everyday life to produce their intended consequences. This means that 
I am focusing on human behavior in organizations where human be­
ings are interacting, doing things to and with each other, attempting to 
influence, striving to govern the formal and informal features of orga­
nizations. It m aybe helpful to think of discovering problems, inventing 
solutions, producing or implementing the solutions, and evaluating the 
effectiveness o f the action. Actionable knowledge is not a policy; a pol­
icy is a solution. Actionable knowledge is the actual behavior required 
to implement the solution. The test of actionable knowledge is that, if 
implemented correctly, it will lead to the consequences that it specifies. 
The test of whether individuals (or an organization) have actionable
5 6  C h r i s  A r g y r i s
knowledge is whether they can produce the consequences that they in­
tend by following the dictates of that knowledge.
Theories-in-Use in Everyday Life
The information science revolution combined with new concepts 
from clinical and social psychology suggests the following way to con­
ceive of human nature. Human beings learn and store in their heads, 
early in life, master programs to design their actions and to imple­
ment their designs.
The master design to deal with embarrassing and threatening issues 
has been modeled. The model (called Model I) claims to capture the 
theories of action that people use (hence their theories-in-use) as com­
pared with those that they espouse. According to Model I, a theory-in- 
use contains a set of governing values. They are to (1) unilaterally 
control the situation you are in, (2) strive to win and not to lose, (3) 
suppress negative feelings, and (4) be rational (Argyris and Schon, 
1974). This model is essentially a limited learning model. It requires the 
recipients to be submissive and dependent. When they respond, they 
too will use the same governing values. Defensiveness will escalate as 
well as misunderstanding and errors. The results will be self-fueling 
processes that are counterproductive to learning (i.e., to detecting and 
correcting error).
Moreover, given the defensiveness in the relationships, the actors are 
not likely to receive valid feedback or to trust the feedback. They will 
therefore be unaware of their responsibility in causing these self-fuel­
ing processes. They will also hold others responsible because they can 
point to the others’ defensive behavior.
In our research, we find that most human beings are unaware of the 
discrepancy between their theory-in-use and their espoused theory, 
especially when they are actually producing it. For example, many in­
dividuals espouse caring and support. They implement these ideas,
very often, by easing-in or being indirect and by covering up the eas­
ing-in. The cover-up is sensed by the receivers, which leads them to 
mistrust what is going on. They too cover up their doubts. The first in­
dividual may then infer that the other is covering up. Of course, that 
inference is covered up. All this occurs rather naturally, spontaneously. 
The actions are taken for granted and hence there is little awareness of 
them while they are being produced. This, in turn, makes it more likely 
that they will blame others if something appears to be going wrong. 
This triggers and reinforces the defensive self-fueling processes.
Organizational Defensive Routines
Organizations populated with individuals using Model I theories-in-use 
create organizational cultures that reward and reinforce Model I. Organ­
izations soon become limited learning systems in dealing with problems 
that are embarrassing or threatening (Argyris and Schon, 1978).
The most powerful organizational features that produce limited 
learning are organizational defensive routines. Organizational defen­
sive routines are any actions, policies, or procedures designed to pre­
vent the players from experiencing embarrassment or threat and, at the 
same time, to prevent individuals from discovering the causes of the 
embarrassment or threat. Organizational defenses are anti-learning 
and overprotective.
Mixed messages are an example of defensive routines. “Mary, you 
run this department but check with Joe when you make tough deci­
sions.” “ Bill, be creative and innovative but be careful.”
The theory-in-use behind all mixed messages contains the follow­
ing logic and rules for implementing them: Communicate a message 
that is mixed. Act as if the message is not mixed. Make the first two 
rules undiscussable. Make the undiscussability also undiscussable 
(Argyris, 1990). For example, it is not likely that someone will say that 
he or she is about to deceive, about to manipulate, about to distort be­
cause that makes them vulnerable to the charge of acting unethically. 
Moreover, to admit and then to deceive is not to deceive; to admit and
then to manipulate is to reduce the likely effectiveness of manipula­
tion; to admit and then distort is to tell the truth.
The most powerful consequences of defensive theories-in-use and 
organizational defensive routines are that they create double binds. If 
individuals tell the truth, they are likely to open up an organizational 
can of worms. If they cover up and cover up that they are covering up, 
they are aware that they are living a life of dishonesty. Whistle-blowers 
are often in that position.
Most human beings whom we have studied feel helpless in such a 
context. They eventually develop a sense of cynicism about organiza­
tions ever changing. Soon they distance themselves from their “dis­
honest” going-along behavior, which in turn distances them from 
their fair share of responsibility for organizational health. They learn 
to live with these second-order consequences by holding organiza­
tions responsible. Hence, we now have an additional and massive set 
of self-fueling processes.
Advice to Overcome Defensive Routines
As I reviewed the advice of scholars who described organizational de­
fensive routines on how to overcome them, I found little that was ac­
tionable. For example, in the government sector the readers were 
advised to persuade effectively, to invoke national interest, to negotiate, 
to treat symptoms because they will relieve pain. If such tactics do not 
work then strengthen the controls, provide monetary incentive and re­
duce red tape, decentralize, and deregulate. I submit that the advice to 
reduce red tape is not news; that the issue for the actors is how to follow 
the advice, and how to make sure it leads to positive consequences. The 
literature ignores this problem of implementation. Hence the advice is 
not actionable (Argyris, 1993).
The same is true for the literature from the private sector. For ex­
ample, executives advise: get good people, use a disciplined approach, 
generate collective responsibility, focus on the future, be polite but 
candid, question intensely. Again, this type of advice is not news, nor 
is it actionable.
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There is another feature of the advice in the literature that is even 
more troublesome. The advice actually reinforces the very defensive 
routes that cause the problems, yet the advisers are apparently un­
aware that this is happening.
For example, a CEO of one of Americas largest corporations de­
scribed how he sought honest feedback from his immediate subordi­
nates. Periodically, he would assign as chair of a meeting an executive 
whom every one of his subordinates trusted. The executive then gave 
the CEO feedback without violating any confidence. This strategy as­
sumes that the subordinates are not able to be candid with their CEO; 
it assumes further that the first assumption should not be tested with 
the subordinates. Finally, it assumes that all this should be done by 
covering up the defenses that make all this necessary.
A CEO advises other executives to build trust. He tells of a colleague 
who often confided in him as to how “lousy” he thought one of his as­
sociates was. The CEO admitted that he wondered what that colleague 
might say about him to others. The CEO mistrusted the colleague but 
never told him so; indeed he covered up his feelings of mistrust.
Such actions are sanctioned by organizational defensive routines. 
Once taken, they feed back to reinforce the defensive routines. We are 
back to the self-sealing, self-reinforcing processes described above.
Model 1 and Rigorous Research Methods
Why is it that scholars describe organizational defensive routines in 
business, governmental, and educational organizations, decrying their 
counterproductive consequences, yet, they end up providing advice 
that is either not actionable or consistent with the very defensive rou­
tines that cause the problems?
One answer is that the scholars are also human beings and their 
personal theories-in-use are also consistent with Model I. When they
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are acting in everyday life they too create defensive routines that in­
hibit reflecting on their actions as well as their community norms. If 
one analyzes the actions of scholars as they compete against each 
other (Watson, 1969) and as they coerce conformity upon those who 
work with them (Mitroff, 1974), it is not difficult to see how Kuhn 
(1962) arrived at the conclusion that scholarly communities were 
loaded with community defensive routines that were protective of 
those in power and inhibited genuine confrontation of new ideas.
There is a second answer to the question. Methods of scientific re­
search are theories of action. If one examines the theory-in-use that is 
the basis for rigorous (positivistic) research, be it experiments, ques­
tionnaires, or interviews, one discovers that it is consistent with Model
I. For example, the researchers strive to be in unilateral control over 
the research in order to maximize their winning and minimize losing. 
They systematically cover up their intentions and objectives from 
their subjects in order to reduce the subjects’ contamination of their 
actions or replies.
Scientists, while in the process of research, also cover up that they 
are covering up. This tends to lead them to produce generalizations 
that are limited to Model I action strategies. For example, the leading 
research on mass communication advises the practitioners to give 
several sides of an issue if the audience is educated and sophisticated. 
It also advises giving only one view of the issue if the audience is not 
sophisticated. In both cases, the advice will work only if the practi­
tioners cover up that they are following either strategy. The advice will 
not work if, for example, you tell the audience that the reason they are 
getting one view is that they are judged to be unsophisticated. A re­
view of the literature indicates that this is not a rare example; indeed, 
it is an exemplar of the advice in the current literature (Argyris, 1980).
There is another strategy of rigorous research methodology that un- 
realizingly reinforces the limited learning features of Model I. Most 
scholars strive to describe and understand their chosen universe. They
are committed to the study of what is, not what might be. The latter is 
normative research and not typically a central feature of basic research.
There are two ways in which the emphasis upon descriptive re­
search is limiting. If the universe is dominated by defensive theories- 
in-use and organizational defensive routines, then careful description 
will produce only countless descriptions of individual and organiza­
tional defensive routines (as was found in the literature review cited 
earlier). Social science researchers become the servants of the status 
quo because they do not conduct research on changing defensive rou­
tines. They do not conduct such research because to execute it re­
quires a theory of a new type of organization (a normative position) 
and specification of how to get from here to there (an intervention 
position, which requires them to go beyond being descriptive).
In order for such research to be produced, it would have to be re­
search that studies, or more likely creates, rare events. The events are 
rare in the sense that researchers would be producing organizational 
phenomena that do not presently exist. In order to do that, they would 
have to develop normative views of reality—views of what the world 
ought to be.
The second way in which the research can be self-limiting is related 
to the concepts of rigor used by social scientists to produce valid 
knowledge. These concepts do not produce user-friendly knowledge. 
In order for knowledge to be user-friendly it must involve concepts of 
causality, concepts of implementation, and concepts of assessment 
that are usable by practitioners in their everyday life contexts. When 
this requirement is not met, the breach between knowledge and ac­
tion, even in the best studies, is large. For example, let us take the clas­
sic study of frustration and regression by Barker et al. (1941).
1. The researchers brought children into an experimental situation 
without briefing them about the experiment. They acted in accor­
dance with good practice by keeping secret the “experimental ma­
nipulation,” namely, frustration. Nor did children make an 
informed decision to participate (although I doubt any were co­
erced if they did not wish to participate).
2. They created an unambiguous situation of frustration. They got 
the children to play with and become attached to some toys. Then 
they placed a physical barrier between the children and the toys, 
thereby “causing” frustration.
3. They had several observers behind one-way-vision glass scoring 
the actions of the children. They used instruments that were 
pretested.
4. They maintained the barrier long enough to collect observations 
that could be used to test their hypotheses rigorously. They con­
trolled the time perspective of the children and the experiment.
5. The results led to the conclusion that mild frustration could lead to 
creative behavior. Beyond that point the children regressed. 
Regression led to more primitive behaviors including aggression.
Now let us turn to using this knowledge in real life. It is, I believe, 
clearly applicable. For example, leaders can be taught that if they frus­
trate people, the latter will regress and a likely consequence is that 
they will become angry and aggressive.
How does a leader translate this applicable knowledge into actionable 
knowledge? For example, a leader goes into a meeting to allocate scarce 
financial resources. He wants to do it fairly, in line with the objectives of 
the organization as a whole and not in line with the parochial views of 
the different subordinates. He also wants to use the opportunity to gen­
erate internal commitment on the part of the subordinates to the final 
results so that the likelihood of effective implementation is increased.
He knows that he must be careful to minimize frustration.
How does he find out what sort of impact he is having? One way is 
to ask the individuals. But doing so maybe playing it safe. Another 
way is to ask them to complete a written instrument. But doing so 
might frustrate the people more, especially those who believe they are 
“winning,” and many see the filling out of forms as a diversion away 
from progress. He might use the observational instruments the re­
searchers used by having an observer present. But how would the ob­
server feed back the data? Would he give it only to the leader? Would
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he include the subordinates? Could not the feedback exacerbate the 
feelings of frustration for some? If so, how would he find out if the 
frustration is increasing?
How would the manager strive not to create frustration that is as 
unambiguously clear as the physical barrier was for the children? Or, 
what behavior might lead to frustration even though the manager 
wishes to prevent this from occurring? For example, the manager will 
have to deny some requests. But how unequivocally clear must the de­
nial be? If she did it with anger, it could lead the subordinates to hold 
her responsible for being ruthless and insensitive, as well as unilateral. 
Would not such feelings have an impact on the feelings of frustration? 
For example, what if the subordinates said privately to themselves, “ If 
you’re so sure of yourself, you take responsibility for the conse­
quences,” and then psychologically withdrew, but covered it up. Such 
withdrawal could ameliorate the feelings of frustration.
All these features indicate a relationship between the researcher and 
the subjects that is consistent with Model I. The moment the practition­
ers attempted to create these conditions in their context, they would 
have to create relationships that are consistent with Model I. At that 
point they would be reinforcing the status quo. Moreover, their actions 
may be seen as disingenuous and gimmicky, if they say they wish to re­
duce frustration in order to insure openness, trust, and empowerment.
What Can Be Done
Producing knowledge about dealing with embarrassing and threaten- • 
ing problems in organizations is not an easy task. It requires finding 
ways to create rare events that in everyday life are often viewed as ide­
alistic or even dangerous. In order to do so, we need to educate 
human beings in theories-in-use that discourage defensiveness and 
encourage learning. We also need to create organizations that not only 
reduce their defensive routines but reward change in the underlying
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governing values and policies. We also require a theory of interven­
tion—how to get from here to there. Finally, we require research meth­
ods that do not compromise validity and generalizability yet 
overcome some of the self-limiting features around actionability de­
scribed above.
A master program has been developed that, when it becomes a part 
of the actors’ theories-in-use, will lead to a reduction of the defensive­
ness of Model I and facilitate underlying learning and change. The 
governing values of this theory-in-use (Model II) are valid informa­
tion, informed choice, and internal commitment to monitoring the ef­
fectiveness of one’s actions. Model II, when used competently, reduces 
organizational defenses, which in turn greatly deepens the learning 
that occurs in organizations around embarrassing and threatening 
problems (Argyris and Schon, 1974,1978).
A theory of intervention is now available to get us from here to 
there. This theory of intervention uses a research methodology that 
values generalizability and validity but gives actionability an equal 
status (Argyris, 1980,1993).
The concepts and skills around discovery, invention, production, 
and evaluation that are used in the research interventions will be the 
same skills that the researchers will teach the practitioners. 
Practitioners now become implementers of the concepts and, at the 
same time, the implementation will become an occasion for the test of 
these skills that are derivable from the theory.
For example, a group of directors of a consulting firm wanted to 
make their organization truly, and persistently, a learning organization. 
Yet, as they observed their own actions, they realized that they were 
helping to create the very organizational defenses that they abhorred. 
They invited me to help them change this situation (Argyris, 1993).
The first step was to observe them in action, especially when they 
were dealing with problems that involved embarrassment or threat.
The concepts of Model I and of organizational defensive routines pro­
vided the basic framework for the diagnosis. I developed an action 
map of the individual, group, intergroup, and organizational defenses 
that caused such activities as politics at the level of the directors and 
the negative consequences that the politics had on creating a gen­
uinely learning organization.
The second step was to feed back the map to assess the extent to 
which the directors would confirm it. The directors made a few changes 
and then confirmed the map. Some expressed bewilderment about how 
they could alter their actions in order to change the map. Others main­
tained that now that they had a map of the causal factors they should be 
able to change the map. This created a dialogue that when analyzed (the 
sessions were recorded) showed that they were creating the dysfunc­
tional features of the map.
The third step was to provide them with learning seminars to learn 
Model II governing values and actions and make them a part of 
Model II theory-in-use. (They could still use Model I for the routine, 
nonthreatening issues.) The instructional vehicle for the seminar was 
a case method designed to diagnose each director’s theory-in-use and 
to provide a realistic basis for changing it. The discussion was orga­
nized around the cases. Each participant led discussions of his case. At 
the same time, I helped the group to focus on the way all of them were 
inquiring. They not only saw that their cases were Model I, but they 
saw that their advice to each other on how to reduce the Model I fea­
tures was also consistent with Model I.
The way out of this dilemma was practice. The seminars provided 
the practice by using the cases the directors wrote. The participants 
began to see how to redesign their actions. They tested their designs 
with each other. In learning from each other, they obtained undeni­
able evidence that their comrades were not as antilearning-oriented as 
each director thought was the case. Otherwise they would have pro­
duced the bypasses, cover-ups, and undiscussables that they illus­
trated in their cases and during the early discussions.
The fourth step was more practice but in everyday organizational 
settings. For example, there was a hot discussion on ownership in
which all directors participated. There were two-person discussions 
around issues of assignment to clients, the staffing of case teams, the 
defensiveness of younger consultants, and who gets promoted and why.
All these sessions were recorded. The respective participants found 
the transcripts very helpful in reviewing their actions. The researchers 
used the transcripts to evaluate evidence of change as well as to design 
future interventions. We could, for example, quantify the behavioral 
changes from Model I to Model II and observe the consequences. One 
of the most powerfully documented results was that all the problems 
that the directors described, at the outset, as undiscussable and unalter­
able became discussable and alterable—for example, making changes in 
the financial ownership and about the directors’ commitment to the 
firm. Another result was that most directors attempted to introduce the 
new concepts in the managing of case teams. Finally, some directors 
began to experiment with their clients. So far, the experiments have 
been carefully designed and successfully executed. This is leading the 
firm to conceptualize and produce new consulting services that 
promise to add additional value to the advice they give clients.
Concluding Comments
One of the most persistent reactions to the argument above is that it 
disregards the fact that human beings in private, public, and volunteer 
organizations are political animals.
The research suggests that human beings behave politically. But 
there is no evidence that this proclivity cannot be altered. Indeed, re­
search results are just beginning to appear indicating that political pro­
clivity is alterable, as illustrated in the case of the consulting firm. I 
hope that this essay illustrates that true revolution in the management 
of organizations is needed and that it will not occur by changing boxes 
around in organizational charts. Genuine revolution that will persist 
requires changing organizational and individual defensive routines.
In my experience the universities most likely to take this challenge 
seriously are those that take action seriously, such as professional 
schools like ILR. ■
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